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Abstract 
I argue that free trade negotiations function 
as a regulatory node in flows of global capital, 
revealing that social relations of power in-
cluding gender and nationality mediate the 
production of elite spaces of work. Negotia-
tions of the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
Agreement and World Trade Organization are 
considered. 
 
Résumé 
J’argumente que les négociations de libre-
échange fonctionnent comme des nodules 
réglementaires dans les mouvements de cap-
ital global. Cela révèle que les relations so-
ciales de pouvoir, y compris celles qui 
impliquent le genre et la nationalité, servent 
d’intermédiaires en ce qui a trait à la pro-
duction d’espaces de travail élitistes. Nous 
prenons en considération les négociations 
telles que l’Entente de l’espace du Libre-
échange des Amériques et l’Organisation 
mondiale du commerce. 
 
 
This paper examines the creation of 
elite spaces of work through the understand-
ings of those who hold a stake in the process 
of negotiating a free trade agreement. I dis-
cuss the material construction of elite spaces 
of work through social relations of power as 
experienced by Canadian and Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM)
1
 negotiators during 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
negotiation process (1994–2005). I also con-
sider trade liberalization negotiations more 
generally at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in that same time period as ex-
perienced by the 15 trade negotiators inter-
viewed for this research. Feminist geograph-
ers Nagar et al. (2002) suggest that a focus 
on elite sites of work has typically reified a 
Eurocentric and masculinist focus on global 
capital while neglecting alternative sites in 
which the gendered processes of global 
capital are evident, such as informal labour 
and the home. Feminist interventions, how-
ever, increasingly support and suggest the 
need for further investigation into spaces of 
corporate capital and elite sites of work. For 
example, Hooper (2001) insists on an exam-
ination of gendered struggles between groups 
of men and privileged women, which “are 
taking place at the top” (59). And as Mullings 
(2005) concludes in her research on Carib-
bean banking industries, not all women ex-
perience these elite spaces as oppressive, 
while not all men find them liberating. In this 
paper, I argue that the transnational location 
of elite sites of work reveals the complexities 
of how a privileged group of men and women 
of many nationalities figure in the production 
of such spaces. Exclusivities characterizing 
many elite sites of work are not given but 
accomplished, lending strength to feminist 
projects that seek to undo the inaccessibility 
of these spaces to the public and to nego-
tiators from so-called “smaller economies”
2
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such as those of the English-speaking Carib-
bean.  
In order to ground my claims, I first 
define more clearly what I mean by “elite 
spaces of work” as regulatory nodes by turn-
ing to the ideas of feminist and economic 
geographers. I then explore the diversification 
of the positionality of trade negotiators in 
these spaces. Interviews with negotiators 
from differently positioned economies, inclu-
ding Canada, and from “smaller economies,” 
such as those of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), a trade bloc, demonstrate that 
performances of gender and national identity 
mediate and diversify the positionality of this 
elite group of men and women. I conclude 
that social relations of power such as gender 
and nationality are not only present in the 
work lives of trade negotiators, but position 
them differently in elite spaces of work. 
 
Elite Spaces of Work as Regulatory Nodes 
Roberts (1995, 1999) considers trade 
to consist of a network of spatial flows within 
which there are many creative spaces, or 
nodes of activity, contributing to the overall 
process of hemispheric trade. Far from being 
a global-national space that is “discrete, 
bounded, and separate” (Nagar et al. 2002, 
265), elite sites of work, such as the process 
that animated the FTAA negotiations between 
1994 and 2005, are part of such a network. 
Roberts (1995) describes elite spaces of work 
as “regulatory nodes” in the routine circula-
tions of capital (239); that is, they are points 
at which flows of capital are shaped, facilita-
ted, or even confounded. The existence of 
these nodes offers an important opportunity 
to examine both the fallibility and expressions 
of power inherent in the trade negotiation 
process. This study envisions trade negotia-
tions as dependent upon “spaces that are 
anchored in but extend beyond the borders of 
any one nation-state,” in other words, the 
transnational (Mahler and Pessar 2001, 44). 
Elite spaces of work—like those spaces that 
support the process of negotiating a free 
trade agreement—are spatial expressions of 
power between and within nations and act as 
regulatory nodes in the global economy. 
Within the FTAA trade negotiations, I 
focused on Canada’s relationship to four of 
the English-speaking CARICOM countries, 
namely Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. These relationships 
were investigated because, at the most basic 
level, trade negotiations are representative of 
past and present power struggles between 
nations and regions. As Canada’s own history 
includes both overt and benevolent colonial 
interest in the Caribbean (Johnson 2008), the 
existence of regulatory nodes in Western/ 
Northern countries as well as in the global 
South should be considered as integral to the 
production of transnational elite spaces of 
work. Complex histories of colonialism and 
neo-imperialism have produced inequities in 
these different nations’ participation in free 
trade negotiations, with significant inequities 
both between Canada and CARICOM coun-
tries and within this trade bloc of compara-
tively smaller economies. Viewed as an ex-
pression of power within a process of trade 
liberalization, the work of the trade negotiator 
is to participate in a regulatory node that 
shapes flows of global capital. It is through an 
analysis of the experiences of both men and 
women negotiators working on behalf of 
Canada and (post)colonial nations like those 
of CARICOM that the complexity of elite 
spaces of work can be more fully understood.  
 
Understanding Elite Spaces of Work 
Elite sites of work serving the in-
terests of corporate capital are sometimes 
described as the “clean” environments from 
which global economies are orchestrated 
(England 2002; Mullings 1999; Roberts 1999; 
Sassen 1998). These can include the trading 
floors of major banks, stock exchanges, or 
the boardrooms of private organizations. Cer-
tainly mandates to regulate, police, and con-
duct surveillance on informal and illegal eco-
nomic activities emanate from government 
and the private sector, but these are also 
interdependent upon the racialized and 
feminized labour forces employed there; elite 
sites of work exist in part to regulate, but also 
because of their reliance on poorly paid work-
ers and unpaid social reproductive labour 
(Biemann 2002; Mohanty 1999; Mullings 
1999; Scott 2004). While elite sites of work 
associated with free trade negotiations are 
spaces from which the legalities of inter-
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national trade emanate, they also voice the 
interests of large private sector organizations. 
For example, the state acts as a filter for the 
private sector when it authors market “intelli-
gence” gathered from the private sector and 
reshapes it to attract new investments in the 
national economy. 
Elite spaces of work also include the 
spaces in which elected and appointed offi-
cials carry out their work, insofar as the state 
has a hand in facilitating, regulating, and 
participating in the global economy. Thus the 
spaces from within which trade agreements 
are developed and which create the very 
regulations by which other spaces of corpor-
ate capital are governed are a good example 
of the interconnectedness of these regulatory 
nodes in flows of global capital. Many spaces 
that support the existence of ongoing trade 
negotiations are highly mobile within the 
global economy, including the day-to-day 
work spaces of trade negotiators and their 
circuits of travel between countries. Elite 
spaces of work can be mobile spaces of pro-
ductivity and consumption in their own right 
that exist to facilitate and regulate the 
mobilization of capital, goods, and services 
(Sassen 1998). Efforts to create these par-
ticular elite spaces of work in the service of 
corporate capital are an attempt by states to 
assert entitlement to a place in the global 
economy, if only as actors in the negotiation 
of state liberalization. Surprisingly, these 
nodes of activity and the spaces they open up 
are themselves quite fragile, having relied for 
a long time on the assumption that less 
powerful nations will continue to participate in 
them and that civil society organizations will 
remain external to the process.
3
 The recrea-
tion of these sites must be accomplished over 
time and place with brutish reliance on ma-
terial forms of security. A defining feature of 
elite spaces of work is, then, that they are 
exclusionary in degrees and that exclusions 
must be accomplished intentionally or 
through taken-for-granted practices; they are 
not a given. The production of elite spaces of 
work is therefore a point of urgent feminist 
inquiry; what can be created can also be 
undone. 
 
 
Methodology 
In an effort to pursue this line of in-
quiry, I met with 40 interviewees selected 
through purposive sampling
4
 during two trips 
within Canada (Ottawa in October 2005 and 
August 2006), and two trips to the Caribbean 
(Kingston, Jamaica; Port of Spain, Trinidad 
and Tobago; and Georgetown, Guyana, from 
December 2004 to January 2005; and Bridge-
town, Barbados in February 2006). Although 
the scope of research at that time included 
interviews with negotiators, private sector, 
labour, and women’s organizations with a 
stake in the outcome of the negotiations, as 
well as analyses of both policy documents 
and cultural texts on the negotiation process 
at the FTAA and WTO, I limit my discussion 
here to findings from qualitative interviews 
with trade negotiators working for CARICOM 
countries and Canada. The wide range of ex-
periences that trade negotiators had at vari-
ous scales of engagement in these flows of 
trade is very important in shaping the iden-
tities of trade negotiators. Of the fifteen trade 
negotiators in my interviews (six women and 
nine men), four Canadians and eleven CARI-
COM negotiators had had experience negoti-
ating at other fora besides the FTAA. Most 
had negotiated at the WTO and some had 
been involved in negotiating the North Ame-
rica Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy 
(CSME). Geographically, they had experi-
ence negotiating in the Middle East, Europe, 
Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean within 
the span of their careers. Their duration of ex-
perience ranged from two to thirty years as 
observers, technical support, junior and ca-
reer negotiators and, among them, three 
women and five men were very senior in their 
fields. Their knowledge and experience of 
trade negotiations is extensively mapped onto 
multiple geographical and political contexts, 
offering important perspectives on the spatial 
flows of trade in the global economy and rela-
tions of power between nation states.  
The interviews with negotiators fo-
cused first on their professional history and 
then on the placement of their negotiating 
team in the hierarchy of nations at relevant 
negotiating sessions. That I would avoid spe-
cific questions on negotiating positions was a 
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requirement for obtaining the interviews. Most 
of the questions focused on relationships 
between countries or trade blocs and these 
elicited information on the way in which 
negotiations are embedded in a network of 
power relations (e.g., “Is there a country/ 
trading bloc that you could say has a 
significant supporting relationship to your 
country? If so, how?”). Open-ended questions 
on what constitutes a “strong” negotiator and 
instances of “conflict” then produced rich nar-
ratives on negotiating tactics and numerous 
references to the ways in which their experi-
ences were gendered and racialized (e.g., “In 
your experience, what are the qualities of an 
ideal negotiator? Who do you think makes a 
strong negotiator?” and “Can you recount a 
moment of conflict in which you acted as a 
negotiator?”). Towards the end of the inter-
views, I asked negotiators two specific and 
equally important questions about gender: 
“Do you ever recall negotiators having an 
interest in the gendered impacts of trade 
liberalization?” and “Do you feel that gender 
ever plays a role in the way some negotia-
tions proceeded?” These questions resulted 
in a discussion of gender as a factor in either 
the attempts of civil society organizations to 
intervene in the development of negotiating 
platforms or in the negotiations themselves. 
Interviews were concluded with the collection 
of some demographic information, which 
often spawned further conversation about the 
background necessary for becoming a nego-
tiator.  
 
The Exclusionary Power of Elite Spaces of 
Work 
One form of exclusionary power in 
elite spaces of work is sexism. Two career 
negotiators put it to me succinctly:  
CARICOM negotiator: “Gender is a major issue... 
particularly in trade. It’s still a very much male 
dominated field, very male dominated and very 
macho in its whole.”  
Canadian negotiator: “Like maybe in a context 
where it’s predominantly males, that they might 
not—without getting into specifics—I’m aware of 
cases where because some people are women, 
the other side may not take you as seriously.”  
(Interviews, 2004–2006) 
The sexism and anti-feminism of elite spaces 
is often subtle, but the relative exclusion of 
women from these spaces is telling. There is 
extensive literature to demonstrate that elite 
spaces of work, including work inside private 
corporations, the banking and financial ser-
vices industries, and the negotiation of trade 
agreements, whether in complex multilateral 
arrangements or bilateral negotiations be-
tween only two countries, are exclusive of 
gender considerations in a variety of ways 
(Barriteau 2001, 201; England and Ward 
2007; England 2002; McDowell and Court 
1994; Massey 1995; Patil 2006; van Staveren 
et al. 2007, 33). First, gender representation 
of both men and women at the level of negoti-
ations and technical support can be unbal-
anced (Hassanali 2000; Peebles 2005). De-
spite the fact that many public and foreign 
services have become gender-balanced in 
certain fields, and that in particular countries 
women have been highly represented in the 
public service, the atmosphere of trade nego-
tiations as a masculinist one persists.  
Second, the everyday sexism some 
negotiators described in their interviews re-
flects whether gender will be taken seriously 
as an analytical category in the development 
of negotiating platforms and the norm is that it 
is not. The existence of systemic discrimina-
tion in pay, the delegitimization of something 
broadly termed “women’s issues,” as well as 
individualized interactions that support the 
exclusion of a more complex understanding 
of gender as an analytical category for deter-
mining the impacts of trade liberalization all 
contribute to gendered exclusions (Barriteau 
2001, 28; Heyzer 2005; Nordås 2003; Swamy 
2004; Wedderburn 2002). Feminists from 
both the global North and South have tried to 
insert mechanisms for studying and measur-
ing the gendered impacts of free trade nego-
tiations, particularly at the WTO, as well as at 
the national level in their own economies 
(Roy 2004; UNCTAD 2004; Williams 2007, 
2003; Wyss and White 2004). These efforts 
have had some impact. For example, two of 
the most senior and powerful negotiators I 
interviewed from Canada and CARICOM, 
 www.msvu.ca/atlantis ■□    36.1, 2013   91  
both men, noted some interventions on 
gender and trade liberalization—one even 
pointed me to the relevant feminist research-
ers who had attempted to sway his unit’s 
negotiating positions. But in large part, fem-
inist interventions are under-recognized. For 
example, when a high-level female represen-
tative working as a specialist in her field was 
approached by a women’s organization to 
speak publicly about her work, she re-
sponded, 
CARICOM negotiator: “I said ‘trade liberalization 
and gender...would gender have something to do 
with it?’, because I had not thought of it before to 
be quite honest. I don’t think many of us had.” 
(Interviews, 2004–2006) 
McDowell and Court (1994) argue that occu-
pational sex typing is distinct from occupa-
tional segregation by sex, explaining why 
some types of jobs may often be performed 
by both men and women, but are still con-
structed through sexist ideologies (233), 
which may partially account for this nego-
tiator’s reaction.  
J.K. Gibson-Graham (1996, 2006) 
points out that an assumption about who 
exactly orchestrates the global economy is 
implicit in mainstream discourses of global-
ization and neo-liberalism. In these dis-
courses, it is assumed that power automatic-
ally accrues to persons holding positions in 
their national governments, global financial 
institutions, and multinational corporations, 
impermeable environments where economic 
policy is created to suit the interests of elites. 
 Mullings (2005) departs from other 
feminist studies of the exclusivity of elite 
spaces of work in that she explores contexts 
where whiteness and a singular dominant na-
tionality cannot be taken for granted. Mullings 
finds that select groups of women with ad-
vanced levels of education have and continue 
to benefit from global restructuring by virtue 
of class-based differences. For upper-class 
women in Jamaica with advanced education, 
this has meant new access to managerial 
positions in industries that previously fa-
voured men and people of European descent, 
their numbers relatively outstripping those of 
women in Northern industrialized countries 
(2). She also recognizes the significance of 
racialization in divisions of labour on a global 
scale and within the Jamaican financial ser-
vices sector. These class-based advantages 
launched the most elite of my interviewees 
from relatively small elite communities onto a 
global stage in a way they found liberating: 
CARICOM negotiator: “Now when you actually 
move into the international community, all those 
things fall away. And this will also be the same for 
women I find. I find internationally there’s less of a 
concern with the family, where you came from, 
what race you are, what gender you are if you’re 
dealing with issues at the international level. That’s 
what I find.”  (Interviews, 2004–2006) 
What is most important about Mullings’ study 
is that she acknowledges a global division of 
labour in the work of elites and the ways in 
which the upper classes of postcolonial coun-
tries, like those of the Caribbean, may have 
benefited from some aspects of global re-
structuring. These benefits are clearly limited, 
however, particularly when the complexity of 
social relations of power at work in the negoti-
ating room are considered. 
 
Social Relations of Power at Work in the 
Negotiating Room 
In the process of trade liberalization, 
elite spaces of work are normatively construc-
ted as the workplaces of “large” and powerful 
economies whose representatives may be 
marked through whiteness and masculinity 
with nationality being the central relation of 
power. Gatekeeping and politeness function 
in these contexts much as they do in other 
elite office environments (England 2002, 
207). It was with great interest, then, that I 
noted the use of “politeness” to both exclude 
and achieve access to invitation-only “green 
room” negotiation sessions at the FTAA and 
WTO. In the world of theatrical performances, 
the “green room” is where actors prepare and 
return after performances, relaxing out of 
character and out of sight of the audience. 
The green room approach to negotiations is 
especially pertinent to multilateral negotia-
tions where increasingly smaller concentric 
circles of invitees participate in private negoti-
ations and then return to the larger group to 
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offer their conclusions. This approach is 
commonly used at the WTO and was trans-
posed to the FTAA negotiations without much 
discussion, according to the negotiators I 
interviewed. Achieving access to inner circle 
negotiations is quite straightforward if one’s 
national identity already credits the negotiator 
with access; simply being a member of a 
large country helps keep you in the room. In 
those instances when national status alone 
did not circumvent gatekeeping, negotiators 
had to use other methods, and these were 
limited for women. Whereas a young woman, 
a junior CARICOM negotiator, was prepared 
to take her exclusion for granted, a more 
experienced negotiator, who the interviewee 
identified to me as a person of colour, used 
his knowledge of the social terrain of negoti-
ating rooms to gain access: 
CARICOM negotiator: “You know you’re a small 
country so you’re not invited to the...bigger things 
sometimes...so I had heard about it and I said 
‘There’s this meeting going on and we’re not 
invited so we can’t go.’  
“He just turned up. ‘I’m sorry I’m late! I’m sorry I’m 
late.’ ‘Yes, we’re discussing so-and-so’, and I 
mean nobody could ask him to leave…[laughs]. 
He’s gone to meetings and sat on the floor when 
there were no chairs because this was what he 
was here for, this is what he needed to achieve 
and this is what he was going to do.”  (Interviews, 
2004–2006) 
In this case, the junior negotiator was affront-
ed by the exclusion of her country from an 
invited session on the basis of its economic 
size. Using the business culture of negotia-
tions to his advantage and polite masculine 
assertiveness, the senior negotiator pretend-
ed their exclusion was a simple oversight. 
Nevertheless, sitting on the floor just to gain 
access indicates the power imbalance be-
tween nations and deeply racializes this 
hierarchy. In order to function successfully, or 
just to survive, trade negotiators might be 
required to suppress their reaction to person-
al insults and racism/sexism. This experience 
also underlines that elite spaces of work in 
which trade liberalization is negotiated are 
normative for those who are unmarked by 
race and post-coloniality. 
National identity helps determine the 
confidence with which trade negotiators enter 
a negotiation and this is also mediated by 
gender. For women whose gender identity 
might have made them a less powerful op-
ponent, their nationality, if synonymous with 
whiteness, carried a great deal of influence. 
For example, one Canadian negotiator re-
called being the only woman on a Canadian 
team seeking the liberalization of the telecom 
sector in a Middle Eastern country:  
Canadian negotiator: “In 1998 I was in my mid-
20s, and here I was telling this group of 8 men that 
they should change their economy. It was great. I 
loved it...[laughs]. And there was this one guy that 
was at the end, he looked at me and he had such 
contempt. And everybody else was very polite, but 
this guy you could read in his eyes, ‘Who the heck 
do you think you are!’ But I’ve seen worse.” 
(Interviews, 2004–2006) 
 
For this young white woman, her nationality 
accorded her some leverage in dealing with 
an elite group of all-male trade representa-
tives from the Middle East. It was an experi-
ence in which she perceived gender inequal-
ity to have been turned upside down by virtue 
of Canada’s relative advantage in these 
particular negotiations. Also at work in her 
story is the unwillingness of the men to be 
perceived as patriarchs and perhaps appear 
“backwards” in the face of their Western 
opponents. To say, then, that being a white 
female Canadian trade negotiator obviates 
the sexism of male trade negotiators is in-
correct. Rather, nationality marked by white-
ness works problematically to advance a kind 
of gender “equality” for some female negoti-
ators by ameliorating their relative influence 
with certain countries. One female career ne-
gotiator with extensive technical experience 
was adamant on this point but offered the 
perspective of negotiators who are women of 
colour or who negotiate for countries from the 
global South:  
CARICOM negotiator: “And there have been some 
very powerful women…from the U.S. and from 
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Latin America. But those women have to just... 
forgive my phraseology, ‘kick ass’ in order to get 
the same respect that the men get…There are two 
things: (1) when you come from the U.S. I guess 
you get an automatic respect because with the 
U.S. you’re big. But even then you have to be 
much harder than you normally would be because 
you’re in a man’s world. And (2) there are a lot of 
things that the men take advantage of or do [or] 
say that are inherently offensive. But you just learn 
to ignore it.” (Interviews, 2004–2006) 
Women of colour in this negotiator’s experi-
ence do not have the privileges some white 
female negotiators enjoy as a result of their 
national affiliation. The fact that both white 
women and women of colour might be re-
quired to ignore sexism underscores the 
normative construction of the negotiating 
room as a masculine space. “Just learning to 
ignore it” may mean that female trade nego-
tiators can function effectively in their job, but 
sexism never disappears as a result of any 
advantages they might enjoy as a result of 
national hierarchies, and women and men of 
colour always contend with racism.  
Regardless of their nationality, most 
male negotiators tended to be completely un-
aware of the sexism experienced by their 
female colleagues. One interesting observa-
tion was made by a CARICOM trade negoti-
ator who argued that nationality, gender, or 
any other personal characteristic was less rel-
evant than when negotiators had a common 
past work experience. My sense is that he felt 
these issues of difference should not matter, 
as well as that they did not matter. His 
induction into sites of free trade negotiations 
at the WTO was more relevant and useful in 
creating alliances at hemispheric negotiations 
of the FTAA than was his national identity. 
“We were great buddies…and we were able 
to understand each other…[Our experience 
at the WTO] was the link that got us to 
talking, and seeing each other’s positions, 
frankly, rather than with a flag on our chest” 
(Interviews, 2004–2006). This negotiator’s 
ability to cast off the “flag on his chest” 
indicates that nationality need not be a lim-
iting feature of the working environment, at 
least in networking with other male trade 
negotiators. It is important to note though that 
his experience was at odds with more senior 
CARICOM negotiators from an earlier gener-
ation who were interviewed and who experi-
enced nationality primarily as a racialized cat-
egory in the early post-independence period. 
Whether women trade negotiators can reap 
the same benefits of common work experi-
ence is not guaranteed. The national identity 
of trade representatives is a flexible identifier 
that changes over time and according to the 
gender of the participants. 
 
Gender, Nation, and the Ideal Negotiator 
The “ideal” negotiator in such settings 
is anything but a feminine consensus builder. 
But neither is he a hyper-masculine patriarch 
who stubs out expensive cigars on the desk 
of the opposing party or storms from the room 
two days before the expiry of a deadline in 
order to have his way (Greenaway 2008), nor 
is he the aggressive bully (Jawara and Kwa 
2003, 149). Interviewees from Canada and 
CARICOM nations asserted that negotiators 
achieve their objectives by choosing appropri-
ate negotiating techniques. Many negotiators 
emphasized the ability of the ideal negotiator 
to create consensus, especially in assisting 
two or more others to reach an agreement. 
“The art of negotiation is making sure that 
you can both get the best of what you want 
without hurting the other. It’s not personal. It’s 
all about your country’s interests and that’s 
what you’re there for,” said one CARICOM 
negotiator (Interviews, 2004–2006). A num-
ber of negotiators described similar situations 
and admired those who could orchestrate 
these types of agreements and have all the 
parties move on in an amicable way to the 
next item under discussion. The charac-
teristics of the ideal negotiator that many of 
my interviewees valued, such as being able 
to arrive at consensus, or persistence and 
politeness, did not render male negotiators 
“effeminate” in any way and were admired by 
both men and women alike because such a 
quality signified an understanding of the com-
plexity and technical difficulty of their work. 
There is another facet to the identity 
of the ideal negotiator, which is that he or she 
is able to leave family life behind or at least 
marginalize family responsibilities so that they 
can follow the never-ending schedule of 
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meetings. There were distinct differences in 
the points of view put forward by male and 
female negotiators on this issue, although all 
felt constrained by it. Trade negotiators who 
had children all lamented the time spent away 
from home. But women cited the amount of 
time they were required to travel away from 
family as one major reason for leaving the 
field. One former negotiator noted that men 
might not be similarly disadvantaged if their 
spouses were willing to parent on their own, 
implying that many male partners are not as 
willing to take on the role of the single parent 
and underscoring the heteronormativity of 
elite spaces of work: 
CARICOM negotiator: “[I]n my case you have a 
child and things tend to wear a little differently. 
Men can travel all the time because their wives are 
at home looking after the children. When you’re 
the mother you don’t really have that...Some 
people may but I didn’t feel I had that freedom to 
do my job and go off. And so that’s why I 
quit…because I just was constantly on the 
road…So it still continues to be a very male 
dominated field and most of the women either 
don’t have children or have grown children.” 
(Interviews, 2004–2006) 
The opportunities for younger women to 
apply themselves fully in ongoing trade nego-
tiations are limited by requirements of their 
work if they want families. Marginalizing fam-
ily life has long been a part of workplace re-
quirements in elite spaces of work where 
reproductive work is constructed as extran-
eous to paid work (Massey 1995, 490–4). My 
interviews revealed that the same is true of 
the ideal negotiator, who has historically been 
male. Women who make these sacrifices are 
forced not to have children, to severely curtail 
their participation in social reproduction and 
substitute their own with paid care (or both), 
or to enter the field of active negotiations at a 
later stage in their careers. Largely unpaid 
reproductive work thus subsidizes the par-
ticipation of male negotiators in elite spaces 
of work, adding to the range of “invisible” eco-
nomic interactions such as domestic, emo-
tional, and sexual labour that are unaccoun-
ted for in flows of global capitalism (Maliha 
and Graham 2010; Bakker 2003). 
Conclusion 
Trade negotiations are one of the key 
nodes of activity that shape transnational 
flows of trade between countries. My re-
search reveals that there are concentric cir-
cles of exclusion mediated by gender, nation, 
and class. Their work is one of the points at 
which the state continues to be a relevant 
force in its attempts to regulate global flows of 
commodities, services, labour, and capital. 
But social relations of power, such as gender 
and nationality, affect how men and women 
of different nationalities and, by implication, 
racialized identities, experience negotiations 
while social relations of power such as class 
have tended to admit elites from CARICOM 
countries to the negotiating process. I found 
that trade negotiators may find commonality 
in their class and educational backgrounds 
but are differentiated through their national-
ities and by virtue of their membership in 
states which have undergone periods of 
colonialism. As such, gender, nation, and 
class are social relations of power that medi-
ate the construction of these particular elite 
spaces of work. It is through the experiences 
of negotiators themselves that the spatiality of 
trade negotiations is most visible. Through 
their observations, the fallible process of 
creating spaces of negotiations, and the 
types of gender performances that are ac-
ceptable in these spaces are differentiated.  
 
Endnotes 
1. CARICOM includes fifteen member coun-
tries: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, 
Republic of Costa Rica, Commonwealth of 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Republic of 
Haiti, Jamaica, Federation of St. Christopher 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Republic of Suriname, and the   
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
2. The term “smaller economies” was used to 
describe any participant in the FTAA negotia-
tions whose market size (population) and 
Gross National Product were significantly less 
than others. I have problematized the ge-
nealogy of this term in more detail elsewhere 
(Johnson 2008).  
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3. Extensive protests by civil society organ-
izations stand in contrast to the degree to 
which such organizations are actually permit-
ted to participate. In 1998, ministers involved 
in the FTAA negotiation process envisioned 
civil society organizations constituting a 
special committee to study the impacts of free 
trade, among other things, after the agree-
ment was concluded, (FTAA 2003: Chapter 
XXI, article 4). By 2001 and at three sessions 
after that, civil society organizations could de-
liver position papers to the convenors of the 
FTAA at large and have their views recorded 
and published on the FTAA website. 
 
4. Purposive sampling is the practice of seek-
ing research participants who offer insightful 
perspectives on the focus of the research, 
rather than attempting to recruit a represen-
tative group. This method is often employed 
in the study of elites (Carnevale et al. 2005). 
 
References 
Bakker, I. “Neo-liberal Governance and the 
Reprivatization of Social Reproduction: Social 
Provisioning and Shifting Gender Orders,” 
Power, Production and Social Reproduction: 
Human In/security in the Global Political 
Economy, I. Bakker and S. Gill, eds. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, pp. 66–82. 
 
Barriteau, E. The Political Economy of Gen-
der in the Twentieth-Century Caribbean. New 
York: Palgrave, 2001. 
 
Biemann, U. “Remotely Sensed: a Topog-
raphy of the Global Sex Trade,” Feminist 
Review. 70 (2002): 70–88. 
 
Carnevale, P.J. et al. “Methods of Negotiation 
Research II,” International Negotiation. 10.1 
(2005): 1–2. 
 
England, K. “Interviewing Elites: Cautionary 
Tales about Researching Women Managers 
in Canada’s Banking Industry,” Feminist 
Geography in Practice: Research and Meth-
ods,  Pamela Moss, ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2002, pp. 201–213. 
 
England, K. and K. Ward, eds. Neoliberaliz-
ation: States, Networks, Peoples. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007. 
 
Free Trade Area of the Americas. Third Draft 
FTAA Agreement, TNC/w133/Rev.3,  Novem-
ber 21, 2003. <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAA 
Draft03/Index_e.asp> 
 
Gibson-Graham, J.K. A Postcapitalist Politics. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006. 
 
———. The End of Capitalism (As We Knew 
It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
Greenaway, N. “Tough-talking Former Trade 
Negotiator Simon Reisman Dies,” Windsor 
Star, March 10, 2008. Retrieved May 16, 
2008. <http://www.canada.com/windsorstar/n 
ews/story.html?id=f47d7773-78a9-4d98-92d-
b-59e171be9aaf&k=88490>. 
 
Hassanali, S. International Trade: Putting 
Gender Into the Process; Initiatives and Les-
sons Learned. A Discussion Paper Prepared 
for the Status of Women Canada, December 
2000. Retrieved May 15, 2004, <http://publica 
tions.gc.ca/site/eng/293540/publication.html>. 
 
Heyzer, N. The EU’s Responsibility at the 
WTO: Environment, Gender and Develop-
ment. WIDE (Globalizing Gender Equality 
and Justice); FOEE (Friends of the Earth 
Europe); European Parliament’s Intergroup 
on Globalisation and the Heinrich Böll Foun-
dation, European Parliament, Brussels, Nov-
ember 9, 2005.  
 
Hooper, C. Manly States: Masculinities, Inter-
national Relations, and Gender Politics. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 
 
Jawara, F. and A. Kwa. Behind the Scenes at 
the WTO: The Real World of International 
Trade Negotiations, the Lessons of Cancún. 
London: Zed Books, 2003. 
 
Interviews with Canadian and CARICOM Ne-
gotiators by J.L. Johnson. October 2005, 
August 2006 (Ottawa, Ontario); December 
96  www.msvu.ca/atlantis ■□    36.1, 2013  
2004–January 2005 (Kingston, Jamaica; Port 
of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; Georgetown, 
Guyana); and February 2006 (Bridgetown, 
Barbados).  
 
Johnson, J.L. “‘All’s Fair in Love, War and 
Negotiations’: Gender, Nation and Spaces of 
Corporate Capital at the Free Trade Area of 
the America (FTAA).” Ph.D. dissertation, York 
University, 2008. 
 
Maliha S. and J. Graham. “The Global 
Household: Toward a Feminist Postcapitalist 
International Political Economy,” Signs. 36.1 
(2010): 99–125. 
 
Mahler, S.J. and P.R. Pessar. “Gendered 
Geographies of Power: Analyzing Gender 
Across Transnational Spaces,” Identities. 7.4 
(2001): 441–459. 
 
Massey, D. “Masculinity, Dualisms and High-
technology,” Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers. 20.4 (1995): 487–99. 
 
McDowell, L. and G. Court. “Missing Sub-
jects: Gender, Power, and Sexuality in Mer-
chant Banking,” Economic Geography. 70.3 
(1994): 229–51. 
 
Mohanty, C.T. “Women Workers and 
Capitalist Scripts: Ideologies of Domination, 
Common Interests, and the Politics of Solid-
arity,” Feminist Approaches to Theory and 
Methodology: An Interdisciplinary Reader, S. 
Nagy Hesse-Biber et al., eds. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1999, pp. 362–388. 
 
Mullings, B. “Women Rule? Globalization and 
the Feminization of Managerial and Profes-
sional Workspaces in the Caribbean,” Gen-
der, Place & Culture. 12.1 (2005): 1–27. 
 
———. “Insider or Outsider, Both or Neither: 
Some Dilemmas of Interviewing in a Cross-
cultural Setting,” Geoforum. 30.4 (1999): 
337–350. 
 
Nagar, R., V. Lawson, L. McDowell and S. 
Hanson. “Locating Globalization: Feminist 
(Re)Readings of the Subjects and Spaces of 
Globalization,” Economic Geography 78.3 
(2002): 257–284. 
 
Nordås, H.K. “Is Trade Liberalization a 
Window of Opportunity for Women?” WTO 
Research and Analysis Working Papers, 
August 2003.  
 
Patil, V. Space, Identity, and International 
Community: Negotiating Decolonization in the 
United Nations. Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Maryland, 2006. 
 
Peebles, D. Increasing Gender Inputs into 
Canadian International Trade Policy Positions 
at the WTO. Ottawa: Research Directorate, 
Status of Women Canada, May 2005. 
 
Roberts, S. “Confidence Men: Offshore 
Finance and Citizenship,” Offshore Finance 
Centres and Tax Havens: The Rise of Global 
Capital. M.P. Hampton and J. Abbott, eds. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 117–139. 
 
———. “Small Place, Big Money: The Cay-
man Islands and the International Financial 
System,” Economic Geography 71.3 (1995): 
237–256. 
 
Roy, K. “Presentation at the November 2004 
Meeting of the US Gender and Trade Net-
work.” Canadian Feminist Alliance for Inter-
national Action (FAFIA), Washington, D.C., 
December 17, 2004. Retrieved August 20, 
2006 <http://www.fafia-afai.org/en/presentatio 
n_at_the_november_2004_meeting_of_the_u
s_gender_and_trade_network_washington_d
c>. 
 
Sassen, S. Globalization and its Discontents. 
New York: The New Press, 1998. 
 
Scott, D. “Counting Women’s Caring Work: 
An Interview with Andaiye,” Small Axe. 15 
(2004): 123–217. 
 
Swamy, G. “The Impact of International Trade 
on Gender Equality,” PREMNotes: Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Net-
work. The World Bank 86 (2004): 1–4.  
 
 www.msvu.ca/atlantis ■□    36.1, 2013   97  
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development: UN Inter-Agency Network on 
Women and Gender Equality Task Force on 
Gender and Trade. Trade and Gender: Op-
portunities and Challenges for Developing 
Countries. New York and Geneva: United 
Nations, 2004.  
 
Van Staveren, I., D. Elson, C. Grown, and N. 
Çağatay,eds. The Feminist Economics of 
Trade. London and New York: Routledge 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.  
 
Wedderburn, J. “Trade, Integration and Gen-
der.” Paper presented on behalf of the CRIES 
Network at the Anuario de la Integración 
Regional en el Gran Caribe, Caracas, 2002. 
Retrieved October 1, 2004 <http://www.ge 
nderandtrade.net/Caribbean/Caribbean.htm> 
Williams, M. “Gender Issues in the Multilateral 
Trading System,” The Feminist Economics of 
Trade. I. van Staveren, et al., eds. London 
and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2007, pp. 277–291. 
 
———. Gender Mainstreaming in the Multi-
lateral Trading System. London: Common-
wealth Secretariat, 2003. 
 
Wyss, B. and M. White. The Effects of Trade 
Liberalization on Jamaica’s Poor: An Analysis 
of Agriculture and Services. Washington, 
D.C.: Women's Edge Coalition and the Carib-
bean Association for Feminist Research and 
Action (CAFRA), 2004. 
 
 
